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1 
TEXT, TRADITION, AND REASON IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: 
AN INTRODUCTION 
Adam Seligman* 
Suzanne Last Stone** 
PREFACE 
 
In the fall of 2004, the Program in Jewish Law and 
Interdisciplinary Studies of Cardozo School of Law organized an 
international conference on the competing claims to authority of text, 
tradition, and reason in both law and religion.  The conference was 
predicated on the view that legal and religious traditions share a 
common interpretive structure and face common dilemmas over how to 
integrate the often contradictory claims of foundational texts, historical 
traditions of textual interpretation, and reason.  Representatives of the 
American constitutional tradition, the three major monotheistic 
religions, and Confucianism took part.  The interdisciplinary spirit of 
the Symposium also was enhanced by the decision to invite scholars 
working in a wide variety of fields, including law, religious studies, 
anthropology, political theory, philosophy, history, theology, and 
sociology.  The participants came together for two days of lively 
discussion and sometimes heated exchange.  Despite the variety of 
traditions represented, the papers related to one another in often 
unexpected ways.  Surprisingly, the debate exposed deep commonalities 
of approach among those who work in the field of law and legal theory, 
irrespective of the tradition they represented, with the sharpest divisions 
emerging between scholars of a single tradition who work from within 
different disciplines. 
The published Symposium begins with introductory comments by 
Professors Adam Seligman and Suzanne Last Stone, the conveners of 
the conference.  Session I follows, consisting of articles exploring 
various theoretical problems emerging from the way tradition represents 
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itself.  The topic of Session II is the political setting of interpretation.  
Session III explores the way the idea of time enhances or challenges the 
authority of certain texts or interpretive practices. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The tension between a foundational text, the accumulated 
traditional understandings of the text, and reason, is a familiar one to 
students of constitutional law.  Today’s Supreme Court is as divided 
over the proper methodology of interpreting the Constitution as any in 
the Court’s history.  What justificatory role, if any, should be given to 
the intent of the framers, the text of the Constitution, precedent and 
political tradition, or moral and practical reasoning?  How should the 
Court order among these different modes of interpretation when they 
are in tension with one another?  These questions are not unique to 
contemporary, secular, constitutionally organized societies.  The tension 
between text, tradition, and reason runs through all of the historical 
civilizations and is attested to in the literature of all cultures.  It is 
especially evident in those religions organized around a revealed text, 
taken to be the word of God.  In those cases, the history of religious 
thought is often a history of different understandings of the respective 
roles of tradition and of reason in the social understanding of the 
foundational text. 
What is ultimately at stake in all of these debates is authority.  The 
different models of interpretation offer different modes of legitimating a 
legal decision.  Predicating the authority of a decision on tradition or on 
reason has radically different implications for the organization of 
society and for the legitimacy of rulers.  Neither tradition nor reason 
ever existed, of course, in its “pure” form (although such forms have 
always had their defenders).  Yet, the very juxtaposition of the one to 
the other has been one of the most creative tensions in the history of the 
human imagination. 
In Judaism, for example, the authority of the plain meaning of the 
revealed text (peshat), of received opinion (shemua or knowledge from 
tradition), and of interpretive reasoning have all figured prominently in 
the history of interpretation.  The split between the Karaites and 
rabbinic Judaism was a result of the Karaite claim that only the plain 
meaning of the revealed text was authoritative.  Indeed, within the 
rabbinic interpretive tradition itself there was a tension between the 
authority of received opinion and the role of dialogic reasoning in 
understanding the meaning and import of a revealed injunction.  Those 
familiar with the Talmud can point to myriad of examples where a 
debate over the legitimacy of various interpretive strategies, such as 
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analogical reasoning (kal v’chomer) is interrupted by one of the 
interlocutors, as follows: “Why are you arguing over this?  I heard it 
from . . . .”  The statement makes a claim for the authority of received 
opinion over that of dialogic reasoning in the understanding of the text, 
a claim that was often contested.  This tension became a central trope in 
the corpus of the Jewish legal tradition.  Today, the question whether 
open-ended principles of justice, broad scriptural injunctions reflecting 
moral, social, and religious aims, have weight in interpretive practice or 
are capable of generating new legal norms within new political and 
social contexts is a lively one. 
Within Islam, entirely different schools of legal analysis developed 
over precisely the issue of text versus reason, some stressing the 
revealed text and others emphasizing the interpretive role of reason 
(qiyas).  From the Shafi’is and the origins of usul al-fiqh, through the 
writings of Ibn Hanbal and later Hanbalites, to Muhammad ‘Abduh and 
the more contemporary writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, to name just a 
few, the role of reason in providing binding understandings of the 
revealed word has been the source of much contestation.  Much of the 
contemporary struggle over reform in the Islamic world centers 
precisely over the role of reason and the legitimacy of its use in 
approaching, understanding and, ultimately, in the practical, social 
embodiment of the Sunna of the Prophet and of the revealed text of the 
Qur’an.  Indeed, the neo-Hanafi criticism of the Islamic traditionalists in 
the writings of such thinkers as Sayyid Ahmad Khan or Shibili Nu’mani 
is precisely over the role of legal reasoning versus tradition in the 
understanding of the hadith.  This is a conflict, with much at stake, 
which rages from the Indian sub-continent and Pakistan to Egypt and 
Iran.  Thus, one of the important and widely acclaimed books published 
in 1989 in Egypt by Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali bears the title: The 
Sunna of the Prophet: Between the Legalists and the Traditionalists.1  
On the other hand, the interpretive hermeneutics of the Qur’anic 
scholar, Nasr Abu-Zayd, led to his current exile in Holland.  The Iranian 
scholar Abdolkarim Soroush is one contemporary thinker who has done 
much to try to bring about a new legitimacy to rational interpretation in 
Islamic thought, weaving it with a unique appreciation of the work of 
Rumi and the Sufi or mystical strains of the Islamic tradition.  
Unfortunately, not enough is known in the West of Shiite jurisprudence, 
which does not have the separation of legal schools that characterizes 
Sunni Islam. 
The interpretive history of Christianity is strikingly similar.  The 
Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century turned, in large part, on 
the respective roles reserved for interpretation, reason, and hierarchical 
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authority in providing access to the divine word, pitting papal authority 
against the plain meaning of the text and individual conscience as a 
legitimate interpretive tool.  Conflict between Catholics and Protestants 
turned on the search for justification of infallible truth via a self-evident 
criteria.  The Protestants contested papal authority to interpret the word 
of God, while the Catholics dismissed inner conscience as a legitimate 
interpretive device.  Thus, Francoise Veron, one of the masters of the 
Counter-Reformation polemic, labored to show how the Protestant 
claim that scripture was self-evidently clear was manifestly false.  
Rather, it was in need of interpretation.  But predicating interpretation 
on individual conscience, he claimed, would open the flood-gates to 
endless sectarianism and antinomian potentialities: that “search for 
heaven and their lusts as well,” as one early seventeenth century 
Congregationalist described his more enthusiastic neighbors.2  While 
the struggles of the Reformation are over, the issues at stake are still 
very much alive, often dividing mainline Protestant Churches from their 
more evangelical brethren. 
Even in systems lacking a revealed foundational text, such as 
Confucian thought, there is a similar need to navigate between what are 
understood as eternal principles of justice and the more circumscribed 
abilities of human reason to apprehend them.  None of the Confucian 
classics claim divine origin, but all are the works of “sages” who best 
understood the principles of an abstract tian (“heaven” or “nature”).  
The duty of later commentators was to realize and adjust those 
principles to their contemporary reality.  One could criticize 
commentaries on a wide range of grounds, from stylistic inelegance to 
the inauthenticity of the sources they used.  Commentary that departed 
too far from received ideas about eternal principles, however, was 
dismissed as outside the classics (bujing) or simply uncultured (buwen).  
A tension thus existed between claims of fixed knowledge of 
fundamental principles, the need to adjust them to a changing world, 
and the problem of textual openness. 
As these few examples make clear, each tradition-including that of 
secular modernity predicated on the Rights of Man and Citizen—must 
deal with the relative weight and role of traditional authority, on the one 
hand, and of reason and its interpretive tools, on the other, in its own 
attempt to organize social life around foundational texts.  If anything, 
this problem has become greatly exacerbated in the modern world 
where the justification for turning to tradition and the past is no longer 
self-evident, and “reason” has become not simply part of the 
interpretive process, but rather, an independent basis of authority.  With 
this development, which has defined the project of the Enlightenment 
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from the eighteenth century until today, the authority of tradition has 
been either marginalized (in secular societies) or totalized (in the 
“imagined” traditionalism of different fundamentalisms).  The 
Enlightenment rejection of tradition and engagement with realms 
inaccessible to reason has provoked a fundamentalist response, which 
rejects the role of reason in the engagement with revealed and 
traditional texts.  The weaknesses of the first position were already 
evident to those critics of the Enlightenment as J.G.A. Hamman; those 
of the latter, are evident daily.  One result has been the crisis in 
authority that Max Weber projected, when the legal-rational order loses 
all transcendent anchors.  Another has been the increasing inability to 
bridge the differing epistemological and hermeneutical universes of 
tradition and reason.  This conflict is increasingly perceived as a “clash 
of civilizations,” when what is at stake is a conflict within all 
civilizations. 
The changing terms of political and social debate in modernity has 
for the past two hundred years elided these issues, rather than solved 
them.  At the dawn of the twenty-first century, however, we have come 
to realize that we have lost the fruitful tension between tradition and 
reason that had animated traditional societies, at their best. 
For the first time in centuries, a renewed engagement of the one 
with the other may be possible.  As the undisputed supremacy of reason 
as source of social and moral authority has been called into question 
over the course of the last century, and as religious traditions have been 
forced to confront and negotiate within a rapidly-changing and now 
global cultural milieu, new crises, but also a renewed willingness to 
revisit this tension, are surfacing throughout the world.  The revival of 
neo-Confucian thought in China; the encounter between the Jewish 
legal tradition and the authority of a secular state and civil society in 
Israel; the return of Reform Judaism to new/old forms of ritual 
engagement; the cyclically dangerous and thrilling experiment to 
democratize Islamic Iran; the transformed position of the Roman 
Catholic Church to the non-Catholic world following the Second 
Vatican Council; constitutional debates over the teaching of creationism 
in the public schools; and the role of evangelical Protestantism in 
shaping contemporary politics in the United States are but a few 
examples of the social implications of this re-emergent tension. 
The organizers of this conference could think of no better way to 
contribute to this nascent development than through the scholarly 
process.  This Symposium offers a reflective and comparative inquiry 
into the theoretical sources of this change through a comparative 
investigation of the way tradition and reason are negotiated in different 
legal and religious traditions. 
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I.     TRADITION AND INNOVATION 
 
The papers presented below are divided into three general 
categories.  The first category, “Tradition and Innovation,” provides a 
theoretical overview of the tension between traditional authority and 
innovation within Judaism, Islam, canon law, and Confucianism.  In 
both law and religion, in contrast to philosophy, deference to prior texts 
or prior practices, such as a compact, a historical revelation, precedents, 
or custom, supplies an acceptable reason for current decisions and 
practices.  Within religious legal traditions framed around the concept 
of divine revelation, such deference may follow from ideas particular to 
religion, such as the timeless force of divine command or the veneration 
of generations closest to the initial revelation.  Even within religious 
traditions, however, deference to traditional authority is often the 
product of ideas familiar to students of secular law, chief among them 
consent.  Thus, pursuant to Maimonides’ jurisprudence, the authority of 
the Talmud follows from an agreement to canonize its legal decisions 
and the authority of the earlier tannaite generations follows from an 
agreement not to debate their decisions.  Canonical texts and rulings 
may be interpreted and reinterpreted but not rejected.  A common 
critique of such traditional forms of authority is that they subordinate 
innovation to continuity.  The essays in this section explore the extent to 
which claims of traditional authority are understood within the tradition 
itself as confining the capacity of later interpreters to innovate. 
The most far-reaching claim for innovation within tradition is 
advanced by Michael Puett in his overview of early Chinese 
Confucianism.3  Puett focuses on the nature of practice, the relation of 
current to past practice, and the critical question of how to innovate 
from within a tradition of practice.  In contrast to the Western emphasis 
on pure will as the defining locus of change, of action, and, 
consequently, of innovation, Confucianism emphasizes the very ever-
present molding and remolding of tradition.  Presenting what he terms, a 
“ritual theory of innovation,” Puett shows how Confucian notions of 
propriety allow for the continual refining of one’s own responses to the 
constantly changing situation (of life) as defined by and contextualized 
within ritual’s embrace.4  In an inherently fractured world (which is the 
Confucian view of our own), where the center, as it were, never held, 
there are only actions, human actions, to be guided by ritual 
prescriptions.  Thus, the goal of Chinese Confucianism is to build 
continuity in a fragmented world by ritualizing useful actions that better 
 
 3 Michael Puett, Innovation as Ritualization: The Fractured Cosmology of Early China, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 23 (2006). 
 4 Id. at 28. 
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order the world.  In this worldview, new rituals are not innovations; 
rather, viewed retrospectively, they are exemplary actions that should be 
followed.  The Confucian ritual canon is an open canon: new, useful 
rituals are continually added to the canon and useless ones discarded.  
This is a deeply pragmatic vision of ritual and, indeed, Puett describes 
Chinese Confucianism as an excellent illustration of what an anti-
foundationalist, pragmatic “tradition” would look like. 
The very need for ritual regulation of a fractured universe of action 
does, however, also evoke (with Laozi) the call for positing a ground or 
foundation for the ordered act.  Not surprisingly, this ground is to be 
found in the sovereign or ruler who generates order as if it were a 
natural process.  Disguising actual innovation as the timeless, natural 
order of things is a useful instrument of rule—for any sort of 
sovereign—but its dangers, as Puett points out, are significant.  
Interestingly, it is the very anti-foundationalism of the ritual tradition 
that provides a critical corrective (at least potentially) to this tendency. 
Hanina Ben-Menachem’s paper on The Second Canonization of the 
Talmud puts forth a startlingly similar argument to that of Puett.5  Both 
contend that what we term traditional authority is only authoritative in 
retrospect.  New sources of authority emerge within historical time and 
yet are made to appear as if they are the timeless, natural order of 
things.  Ben-Menachem’s argument unfolds through a study of what he 
terms the first and second canonizations of the Talmud.  He begins by 
noting that the Jewish legal tradition may be divided into three distinct 
forms of law: Law, law to be applied, and concrete judicial rulings.  
Law with a capital L, as Ben-Menachem puts it, consists of the trans-
historical and context-free reflection on the Law of God.  As Shlomo 
Fischer later describes, such reflection on God’s law is a utopian 
activity: to try to capture the law “as it exists in the mind of God.”6  
This pure or theoretical law is not authoritative for practice.  Only law 
that has been translated by the sages into “law to be applied,” law that 
can be applied in concrete factual settings is positive law and 
authoritative for practice.  Judicial rulings consist of the application of 
the positive “law to be applied” to specific cases.  The authority of the 
later interpreter to classify a prior law as theoretical only rather than law 
to be applied places considerable power in the hands of the later 
interpreter to keep the law flexible and unfrozen.  Ben-Menachem 
focuses on the subsequent interpretive quandaries of classifying a 
 
 5 Hanina Ben-Menahem, The Second Canonization of the Talmud, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 37 
(2006). 
 6 See generally Shlomo Fischer, Excursus: Concerning the Rulings of R. Ovadiah Yosef 
Pertaining to the Thanksgiving Prayer, the Settlement of the Land of Israel, and Middle East 
Peace, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 229 (2006). 
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particular law as either theoretical law or law-to-be applied.7  This 
quandary marks the career of the Talmud. 
According to Ben-Menachem, the Talmud initially contained all 
three categories of law.  In the medieval period, however, under the 
influence of Rashbam, the Talmud came to be viewed, instead, as a 
codification entirely of law to be applied and practical rulings.  Ben-
Menachem terms this medieval shift the second canonization of the 
Talmud.  It is only with this second canonization that the Talmud 
actually became a repository of authoritative, positive law.  Yet, the 
second canonization portrays the Talmud as if it was authoritative 
positive law to be applied from the very beginning.  Thus, the authority 
of the Talmud as positive law emerges only in retrospect.  The 
Rashbam’s vision of the Talmud is innovative; yet, over time, it appears 
as the natural order of things.  As with Confucianism, pragmatic 
considerations are a driving force behind the instantiation of new 
authoritative traditions.  But whereas Confucianism is theoretically 
committed to pragmatism, a driving force behind the second 
canonization of the Talmud as authoritative law to be applied is the 
contingency of historical circumstance.  The historical vicissitudes of 
Judaism shattered the oral tradition that the jurists possessed of how to 
distinguish between theoretical law and law to be applied.  It was, Ben-
Menachem posits, the loss of this oral tradition that led, in the medieval 
period, to the re-conception of the Talmud as a canonical text of 
positive law to be applied, impeding innovation. 
The critical distinction Ben-Menachem draws between theoretical 
law and law to be applied brings into greater focus the commonalities 
and difference among the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim legal 
traditions.  Although Ben-Menachem claims that the idea of non-
positive theoretical law is unique to Judaism, that claim is open to 
question.  Indeed, both Silvio Ferrari, in his discussion of canon law,8 
and Asifa Quraishi, in her discussion of Islamic law,9 rely on the same 
distinction.  Ferrari argues that the capacity of canon law to change is 
intimately linked to its juridical nature.  Positive law is authoritative and 
confining.  But later interpreters arbitrate whether canon law is properly 
seen as positive or theoretical law (law in potentia).  Ferrari describes a 
 
 7 An example of this quandary would be how to categorize Maimonides’ famous Mishne 
Torah.  Often understood as a paradigmatic example of law-to-be-applied, any even cursory study 
of the work will uncover its strong claims to be characterized as theoretical law (Maimonides’s 
discussion of daily prayer is thus, not a simple how-to list of ritual acts, but a meditation on 
divine love). 
 8 Silvio Ferrari, Adapting Divine Law to Change: The Experience of the Roman Catholic 
Church (With Some Reference to Jewish and Islamic Law), 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2006). 
 9 Asifa Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur’an and the Constitution: Similarities in the Use of 
Text, Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 67 
(2006). 
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process within the canon law tradition that is the exact inverse of the 
one Ben-Menachem discerns with respect to the Talmud.  Whereas over 
time, the Talmud was transformed from a corpus that included fluid 
theoretical law into a repository of exclusively positive, authoritative 
law to be applied, canon law was transformed over time from a set of 
authoritative rules into a set of fluid and open-ended values and 
directives.  Thus, what was once perceived as a set of rules was later 
seen to be values and directives.  These values and directives require 
additional human acts of positivization before they bear the juridical 
character of authoritative rules.  It is precisely the authority of later 
human interpreters to control the process of positivization that provides 
canon law with the capacity for change and adaptation. 
Ferrari contrasts the differing juridical structures within Jewish and 
Islamic law on the one hand, and Christian law, on the other, which 
allow for adaptation and historical change.  The first, Ferrari contends, 
deals with change primarily through judicial interpretation, while the 
Christian tradition does so through legislative acts.  Rooted in the 
“ideology of juridical completeness” and the “presence of a legislator 
who is . . . super-ordained above the entire community,” the uniqueness 
of canon law lies in its delegation of legislative authority to a single 
ruler, the pope.10  The pope is charged with the process of transforming 
divine law into positive law.  Thus, the comprehensive code of law that 
comprises canon law is not authoritative in itself; the law is 
authoritative because it is promulgated by a singular authority: the pope.  
By contrast, the Jewish legal tradition has no comparable legislator to 
the pope.  Instead, the task of institutional authority is to coordinate 
among the various, legitimate sources of law and that institutional 
authority is radically diffuse and dispersed.  The Talmud is the last text 
that is authoritative for all Israel.  Post-talmudic rabbinic authority is 
provisional and regional.  Hence, adaptation and innovation is 
accomplished in the Jewish legal tradition through a decentralized and 
pluralist system of interpretation, in contrast to the hierarchical and 
monist system of canon law. 
The contrast between the Jewish and canon law traditions may also 
be re-framed in terms of their conceptions of the nature of divine law.  
Thus, the difference between interpretation versus legislation as modes 
of accommodating divine law to human history and so to historical 
change has much to do with just how that divine law is initially 
understood.  While both Jewish and Christian civilizations understand 
God as a legislator—a giver of commandments-their understanding of 
divine law and of the relation of divine law to human history-and hence 
to socio-historical change—is very different.  The Christian 
 
 10 Silvio Ferrari, supra note 8, at 61. 
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understanding of divine law as a juridical act presupposes legislation as 
the only means of acting upon the law and bringing it into some 
conformity with the processes of human history.  The Jewish, and to an 
extent, Islamic, interpretive traditions are themselves rooted in an 
original, non-juridical understanding of divine law.  Legislative versus 
interpretive modes of dealing with historical change also reflects 
different attitudes toward the relationship between reason and truth.  
Although, in comparison with modern and Enlightenment views, all the 
religious traditions maintain a certain skepticism about the ability of 
reason to produce truth, this skepticism has a radically different salience 
in each of the religious traditions.   Thus, we can posit two ideal-typical 
positions: a) reason as producing truth and b) reason as an attempt to 
explicate truth.  The Jewish legal model, which privileges interpretation 
as a means to bring the divine law into human history is nearer to 
position b); whereas the legislative model of the canon law is nearer to 
position a). 
The distinction between theoretical law and law to be applied is 
also crucial to Asifa Quraishi’s description of Islamic jurisprudence.  As 
Quraishi notes, cognizance of human fallibility is built in to Islamic 
legal reasoning, as is “a pervasive skepticism in the ability of any 
human process to achieve certainty.”11 While divine revelation 
represents absolute Truth, any human knowing, interpretation or 
application of that truth (law-as-applied) can only be partial and fallible.  
Thus, the very same distinction that Ben-Menachem makes between 
theoretical law (halakha) and law to be applied (halacha l’ma’aseh) is 
repeated by Quraishi in the distinction between shari’a (Law of God) 
and fiqh (the law of the jurists).  Within Islamic juridical reasoning, 
there were further, great debates between those who stressed the role of 
reason (ahl-al-ray) and those who stressed the “plain” meaning of the 
text (ahl-al-hadith).  One of the critical points for comparative analysis 
(with the Jewish case for example) would be in the institutional form 
taken by these different strands of the tradition.  In Islam, they 
crystallized into separate schools of law—which remain separate to this 
day; in the Jewish tradition, by contrast, the codification of the Talmud 
as the authoritative legal code for all, subsumed the pre-existing 
differences between different rabbinical schools, for whom such 
distinctions were also relevant (Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai).  Thus, 
while Quraishi can trace the continuing conflicts between the advocates 
of qiya (analogical reasoning) and those of illa (original intent) 
throughout the different maddhab or legal schools, the same cannot be 
done within the Jewish legal tradition where codification made of these 
differences is nothing more than different individual interpretive moves 
 
 11 See generally Quraishi, supra note 9, at 82. 
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rather than formal legal orientations, as noted in our opening remarks. 
Another significant comparative point is the role of original 
communal practice in defining later normative claims.  As Quraishi 
makes clear, at least one Islamic school of law, the Maliki, stressed the 
role of early communal practice—of the Median community, as a tool 
to interpret the Sunna, that is the practice of the Prophet (which was 
taken as normative).  The debate within Islam is, in part, over what is 
canonical and hence authoritative.  Quraishi poses this question starkly: 
Is it the text of the Qur’an that Muhammad gave or is it all of 
Muhammad’s output, including not only his statements but also his 
practices? Furthermore, even if the text is singularly canonical and 
Muhammad’s practices are not in themselves independent sources of 
law, are the prophet’s practices evidence of the proper interpretation to 
be given to ambiguous Qur’anic statements?  This debate over what is 
actually canonical has parallels within the Jewish legal tradition as well.  
The famous story of the Oven of Akhnai, which pits the majority law of 
the sages against a minority opinion which a divine voice attests as 
correct, poses the question equally starkly: Is revelation, whenever it 
appears, authoritative, or is the product of the initial revelation, the text, 
authoritative?  Similar questions surround the role of customary practice 
in Jewish law.  Are such practices an independent source of law or are 
they evidence of the proper interpretation of ambiguous legal 
principles?  Thus, the Talmud records Hillel’s instruction to observe 
what the people are doing in order to resolve a legal question related to 
the paschal slaughter.  Indeed, medieval jurists in Ashkenaz often 
viewed the holy community of Ashkenaz as reliable carriers of the 
tradition, whose practices attested to the true content of the law.  
Nonetheless, this theme is more muted in the Jewish legal tradition, 
possibly because the reliability of the chain of tradition and thus of 
continuous practice was cast into doubt by historical disruptions.  
Indeed, one important strand of halakhic theory locates the source of 
scholarly disputes about the law in the disruption of the chain of 
tradition with the destruction of the Temple and the Exile.  It is 
therefore primarily the task of the jurists to reconstruct the lost or 
forgotten divine law. 
This comparison raises an important question about the ways 
history influences the continuing process of tradition and its 
construction and reconstruction in every generation.  Past practice, as 
opposed to simply appeals to text and reason as interpretive 
mechanisms, is a separate variable of significant weight.  Traditional 
practice may impede innovation more severely than either appeals to 
texts or to reason.  Take, for example, the famous rabbinic dictum that 
everything a “talmid chacham” (meaning, interestingly enough, both a 
great scholar and/or the student of a great scholar) can teach has already 
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been given by Moses at Sinai.  On the simplest level this statement 
could be read as limiting innovation, for the statement implies that all 
knowledge has already been given.  Yet, this statement is also a great 
legitimizer of innovation.  The statement reduces the tension between 
novel interpretations and tradition by claiming that any innovative 
interpretive moves were always, already part of the tradition.  It is an 
open and interesting question whether such a fluid vision of tradition 
would be possible if one of the pillars of tradition was original practice. 
The essays in this section focused until now on the extent to which 
rhetorical claims of traditional authority, nonetheless, make room for 
actual innovation. Christine Hayes’s essay, Rabbinic Contestations of 
Authority,12 reminds us that the tension between authority and 
innovation may proceed in precisely the opposite direction: with radical 
statements of authority to innovate accompanied by an actual retreat 
from innovation. Hayes notes that many aggadic passages in the 
Talmud, including the famous story of the Oven of Akhnai cited above, 
proclaim a bold theory of rabbinic authority. And, indeed, early rabbis, 
especially in Palestine in the first two centuries, enacted legislation 
contrary to Torah law, engaged in creative forms of scriptural 
interpretation, asserted the power to declare facts as a matter of law, and 
relied on legal fictions. Yet, from the fourth century and on, while the 
rhetoric of bold rabbinic authority persisted, rabbis, especially in 
Babylonia, not only retreated from all four practices, they recast the 
earlier bold exercises of authority as conservative or emergency uses of 
authority.  
For Hayes, it is unremarkable that later rabbis would express 
anxiety over departing from the apparent thrust of Scripture, or adopting 
erroneous or contrary-to-fact rulings, given a legal system that 
represents itself as divine in origin—as emanating from a revealed text, 
free of falsehood. Rather, Hayes argues, “it is the early and primarily 
Palestinian tolerance for radical exercises of rabbinic authority that is 
remarkable.”13  According to Hayes, the earlier Palestinian practice may 
have been influenced by the surrounding Roman, secular legal culture, 
which emphasized multiple sources of law and legal authority. But, as 
the memory of Roman legal culture faded, as the center of rabbinic 
authority moved to Babylonia, and as the Jewish legal system became 
more clearly hierarchical—subordinated to the ultimate authority of the 
divine text—the rabbis honored their predecessors work in word far 
more than in deed. 
The final paper in this section raises an important challenge to the 
claim that authority and innovation are reconcilable within any legal 
system.  With great passion, Asma Barlas shows how Muslim religious 
 
 12 Christine Hayes, Rabbinic Contestations of Authority, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 123 (2006). 
 13 Id. at 138. 
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scholars are continually able to move the discourse from text to tradition 
to reason, when their anti-female interpretations of Islam are 
challenged, without losing their power to frame the discourse itself.14  In 
this way, they preserve their role as gate-keepers of religious meaning.  
Focusing on the often misogynist positions of Muslim ulema and 
exegetes, Barlas points to problems created for women by the continual 
shift from arguments based on text to those based on tradition or reason 
as legitimations for their own agendas and interests.  Each legitimating 
structure is capable of trumping the other; yet, the interpreters never 
directly face the tension between text, tradition, and reason.  Instead, 
they use each, in different contexts, to resist change and to deflect any 
critique of the patriarchal nature of religious knowledge as it is currently 
structured.  Indeed, the very multiplicity of authoritative bases only 
serves to safeguard the discourse from any meaningful critique.  Such, 
Barlas claims, is the nature of authority.  The relative roles of tradition, 
text, and reason are, at the end of the day, always inherently political, as 
is the interpretive process.  This is the insight which Barlas would have 
us assimilate into our readings of the inherent tensions between these 
different principles.  She ends by staking the claim for a new, more 
liberating, reading of the Qur’an as a no less legitimate contribution to 
the continual remaking of tradition. 
 
II.     POLITICS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
Barlas’s focus on the political aspect of authority serves as a useful 
bridge to the second category of this Symposium, Politics and 
Interpretation.  This category examines the relationship between 
interpretive practices and political contexts.  The doctrine of free will 
was developed by Mutazalite philosophers within the context of a 
struggle for the legitimation of political rule.  Catholic and Reformation 
debates over the role of reason in the interpretation of scripture were 
also a political struggle over the boundaries and nature of the Christian 
community.  Different Jewish perceptions of the duties owed to non-
Jews and of the acceptable scope of Jewish-Gentile relations were set in 
the context of political and economic dependency.  The uneasy relation 
of politics to constitutional interpretation was a major theme of slavery, 
segregation, and abortion cases.  Appreciating the role of politics in 
constitutional interpretation and within religious traditions is of vital 
import as interpretive traditions are compelled to respond to 
increasingly complex political, ethical, and social agendas such as 
 
 14 Asma Barlas, Qur’anic Hermeneutics and Sexual Politics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 143 
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abortion, euthanasia, the importance of political sovereignty over sacred 
spaces, and just war, to name but a few. 
At the same time, textual interpretation cannot be reduced solely to 
the external historical forces of a given era.  It is equally structured by 
the internal tension between reason and tradition within a given 
interpretive tradition.  The five papers in this category investigate how 
the external influence of politics and the internal dynamics of an 
interpretive tradition impact one another in different political contexts.  
Two papers in this section concentrate on the changing role of women 
in society.  These are Yaakov Elman’s study of the changing legal status 
of Zoroastrian women15 and Marion Katz’s study of how certain pre-
modern Muslim scholars reinterpreted the practice of the Prophet in the 
field of gender relations.16  The three papers that follow each deal with 
the role of political sovereignty in shaping interpretation.  These three 
papers, by Arye Edrei,17 Shlomo Fischer,18 and Steven Fraade,19discuss 
the effect of political sovereignty on exegetical innovation within the 
Jewish tradition—though with three millennia separating their 
respective cases. 
Elman and Katz both address the changing status of women.  
Elman’s case deals with demographic crises of the sixth century which 
forced Sassanian civilization to accord women a public role that they 
had not had before and to somehow legitimize that role through texts 
that were by any account misogynist in their original or “plain 
meaning.”  Katz traces a very different movement with respect to 
women’s public visibility as articulated by the Sha’afi scholar Ibn ajar 
al-Haytam in the sixteenth century C.E.  Elman is concerned with the 
way the Zoroastrian tradition was reinterpreted to allow women to own 
and manage large agricultural estates and to appear publicly while 
menstruating; while Katz is concerned with showing how one jurist 
argued against women’s appearance in the great mosque in Mecca 
despite the clear acceptance of this practice by the Prophet.  Both 
illustrate well the hermeneutic principles noted above.  The Sasanian 
interpretive moves are simply those of analogical reasoning—which one 
will find in Jewish, Islamic, and other legal traditions.  Moreover, as 
Elman notes, the Zoroastrian tradition seems as comfortable as the 
Jewish with making those moves explicit (though perhaps not so much 
 
 15 Yaakov Elman, Scripture Versus Contemporary Needs: A Sasanian/Zoroastrian Example, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 153 (2006). 
 16 Marion Holmes Katz, The “Corruption of the Times” and the Mutability of the Shari’a, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 171 (2006). 
 17 Arye Edrei, Law, Interpretation, and Ideology: The Renewal of the Jewish Laws of War in 
the State of Israel, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 187 (2006). 
 18 Fischer, supra note 6. 
 19 Steven D. Fraade, Deuteronomy and Polity in the Early History of Jewish Interpretation, 
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so that they are ensconced in the daily liturgy, as in the Jewish case).  
The case of al-Haytam touches on the very point of practice that we just 
discussed.  His reasoning for an innovation (the limitation on women’s 
public appearance) is predicated on the change in the current situation 
of women (who, according to him, allow themselves a new 
lasciviousness in dress and demeanor that did not exist in the Prophet’s 
time).  Note again the reference to past practice—but this time as a 
model, fallen away from, the very declension then justifying new 
practices. 
New political forms provide no less of a challenge for interpretive 
traditions than economic or social changes such as a demographic crises 
or the putative change in women’s behavior.  The emergence of 
Zionism and the establishment of the State of Israel is a remarkable 
challenge for the Jewish legal tradition, forcing it to confront the most 
pressing issues of realpolitik in the contemporary Middle East.  Given 
the development of the halakhic tradition in conditions of exile, the 
Jewish legal system has few precedents to draw on in shaping a Jewish 
legal response to the profound issues raised by political sovereignty.  
Arye Edrei focuses on the different interpretive models halakhic 
decisors have resorted to in confronting for the first time the need to 
articulate a real, practical set of rulings on the use of force.  As Edrei 
makes clear, this became a critical issue when the State engaged in 
military action that involved the death of innocent civilians (Kibya in 
1954 and the siege of Beirut in 1982).  The pivotal question halakhic 
decisors faced is what significance to assign to the glaring gap within 
the Jewish legal tradition on the subject of just war.  The differing 
positions staked out within the rabbinic community are shaped both by 
different religious and political ideologies and also by differing attitudes 
toward the jurisprudential meaning of a gap in the law.  Extreme 
traditionalists, Edrei shows, interpret this gap as a sign that the Jewish 
legal tradition frowns on the use of force altogether.  Thus, political 
sovereignty, which requires force, is itself indicted by these 
traditionalists.  Classic traditionalists view Jewish political sovereignty 
as simply another changed historical setting, which from the 
jurisprudential viewpoint raises the familiar issue of adjusting law to 
new historical situations and new political settings.  They approach the 
legal question in light of the conventional paradigms provided during 
the exilic period for filling gaps within the Jewish legal system.  
Pursuant to the conventional model, gaps within the halakha either 
signify that the subject matter is outside the regulation of law 
altogether—a matter of reshut or permission—or provide license for 
incorporating foreign law, such as international rules for the conduct of 
war. 
Edrei identifies a new form of traditionalism that has emerged 
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among those jurists who view the new political formation of the Jewish 
State as itself vested with positive religious significance.  For the new 
traditionalists, the use of force must be addressed by the Jewish legal 
system and that system must somehow craft rules drawn from 
indigenous halakhic sources.  To incorporate foreign law, instead, runs 
counter to the religious nationalist ideology of resuscitating the halakha 
as national law. 
Edrei’s comparison of the rabbinic approach to that of the first 
Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, is also telling.  Not bound by 
halakhic determination, Ben-Gurion was free to appeal to the Bible 
rather than to the corpus of the Jewish legal tradition.  His approach is 
“Protestant” in that he proffers an individual—his own—reading of the 
Bible to support the effort of nation building.  This appeal to the 
nonjuridical biblical source of the legal tradition to directly inform 
political initiatives is a strong illustration of how a textual tradition can 
be used ideologically by individuals who do not feel themselves bound 
by the authority of tradition.  The turn to revelation, unmediated and 
unconstrained by its traditional interpretation, is analogous to many 
contemporary “fundamentalists” within Islam and Christianity.  The 
rabbis were not free to the same degree and were forced to construct a 
halakhic account of the rules of war—that is an account predicated on 
the law-to-be-applied and not on the trans-historical word of God. 
While Edrei focuses on the rules of war, Shlomo Fischer turns his 
attention to the equally critical question of exchanging land for peace.  
His paper highlights the legal methodology and religious-political 
ideology of a contemporary Sephardic classical traditionalist, Rabbi 
Ovadia Yosef, and contrasts his position with modern Ashkenazi 
schools of thought, which Fischer terms utopian.  For Fischer, both the 
extreme traditionalists and the new traditionalists, which Edrei 
identified, share a utopian orientation.  The extreme traditionalists of the 
Haredi community are devoted to Torah study as the exclusive form of 
communion with God.  The Haredi school wishes to recapture the trans-
historical, objectively true divine law “as it exists in the mind of God.”  
This is implicitly a rejection of the distinction Ben-Menachem drew 
between Law and positive law to be applied.  For this reason, the Haredi 
community bases their rulings on the most severe interpretation, lest 
actual practice fail to correspond to divine halakhic truth.  Rabbi 
Ovadiah’s devotion to the lenient ruling, by contrast, stresses that the 
law to be applied must be realistic and capable of fulfillment by the 
ordinary mass of the populace, given their frailties and constraints.  
Such law is procedurally true rather than metaphysically true.  Rabbi 
Ovadiah’s orientation is also free from the nationalist utopianism of the 
new traditionalists, such as Rabbi Shlomo Goren.  While Goren’s 
rulings are shaped by his utopian vision of the significance of the 
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establishment of the State of Israel, Ovadiah Yosef insists on framing 
the issues within conventional halakhic categories.  In this respect, 
Rabbi Ovadiah departs as well from assessing the establishment of the 
State of Israel in nationalist terms, as do both the extreme and new 
traditionalists.  While the new traditionalists affirm the underlying 
nationalist rationale for the State, vesting it with religious significance, 
the Haredi school opposes a nationalist construction of Jewish identity, 
of which the State is a realization.  For Rabbi Ovadiah, the erection of 
the State is simply a concrete act or event to be judged by ordinary 
halakhic criteria.  The disagreement among these schools over the 
symbolic and material meaning of the Land of Israel, of the Jewish 
State, and of the commandment to settle the land, offer another prime 
example of how ideology informs legal methodology. 
Steven Fraade’s paper, like that of Elman, reminds us that the 
eruption of history is not solely a modern or early modern phenomenon.  
For Fraade, the book of Deuteronomy is an exegetical exercise in 
making a Constitution for the new polity of Israel—the polity of biblical 
times.  The focus of Deuteronomy is to create a new centralized system 
of governance and, at the same time, to unify the new national polity 
through law.  This new Constitution appears, at first blush, to be in the 
form of legislation—the laws set forth in Deuteronomy.  Fraade shows, 
however, that these laws are the product of exegetical interpretation—a 
re-reading of the laws enshrined in the prior four biblical books.  
Through this re-reading, the Deuteronomist introduces innovations that 
would become normative within the Jewish tradition.  Here is an 
excellent illustration of Ferrari’s point on the interpretive nature of the 
Jewish encounter with historical processes.  It is fascinating that Fraade 
bring this interpretive move into the very Pentateuch itself.  Later 
innovations and forms of community—textual communities if you 
will—whether at Qumran or at Yavneh, were already prefigured in the 
very innovations of the Deuteronomist—that is, in the divinely revealed 
text itself! 
III.     TIME AND TRADITION 
 
The third category of the Symposium, “Time and Tradition,” 
moves us beyond the practical and historical and into the meta-legal and 
broader metaphysical contexts or languages within which both text and 
tradition find their home.  Many of the papers in this section deal with a 
substantive aspect of the human condition: love, sacrifice, or identity.  
These papers are united in their focus, however, on the question of how 
the way in which time is apprehended intersects with traditional 
authority. 
Within secular legal systems, authority serves to structure time 
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along the model of religious traditions.  Jurists look backward at the 
sources of law, at precedent and prior practices, as clues to what is 
possible in the future.  Whether this new perspective on time ushered in 
by the Enlightenment disqualifies legal arguments based on past 
tradition is controversial.  The legal sociologist Niklas Luhman has 
argued, for instance, that modern legal systems can be guided only by 
such principles as overlapping consensus, the future welfare of society, 
or positive lawmaking—and not the backward glance of precedent.  Are 
there other justifications for turning to the past within modern legal 
systems?  Do some modern legal systems preserve a pre-modern, 
religious conception of time?  How does postmodernity affect ways of 
apprehending time? 
These questions are confronted directly by Paul Kahn,20 who 
contrasts the differing ways time is apprehended in systems based on 
liberalism and the social contract and in systems based on Christianity.  
For liberalism, political time is perceived as progressing linearly.  This 
conception of time is captured in liberalism’s devotion to reform.  The 
goal of the legal system is to progress over time to an ever-better state 
of affairs.  Christianity perceives the polity as transtemporal.  All 
generations are united in faith in Christ.  Interestingly, Kahn identifies 
the American approach to political time not with liberalism, but, rather, 
with Christianity.  “We the People” is a metaphoric restatement of the 
trans-temporal polity of Christianity.  It is precisely this transtemporal 
conception that accounts for the central place originalism occupies in 
American constitutional interpretation.  The dominance of originalism, 
of searching for the intent of the framers, as the authoritative mode of 
reading the constitutional text, Kahn argues, corresponds to the 
conception of the American people as a transtemporal polity.  
Originalism thus ensures that all successive generations will be united 
and bound together in a common faithfulness to the text. 
Continuing this line of inquiry, Ron Garet asks a deceptively 
simple question: how do certain legal texts and readings within a legal 
tradition gain more authority over time than others?21  He argues that 
those texts in which law and personal sacrifice are inextricably linked, 
carry heightened textual authority.  As he begins, “there are principles 
that are worth dying for.”22  But why does the fact of past sacrifice of 
lives provide an additional reason to adhere to a legal principle, beyond 
the worthiness of the principle on its own terms?  Garet notes that the 
very invocation of the word sacrifice to describe deaths in the course of 
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this-worldly struggles not only situates such deaths within the 
dimension of the sacred but implies that these deaths are somehow 
addressed to the present audience, authorizing and directing those living 
in the present to pursue a particular course of conduct.  Such 
communication is central to textual authority, Garet argues.  This form 
of textual authority is transparent in the case of Christian Scripture.  But 
the Reconstruction Amendments and the civil rights laws they launched 
also exhibit this feature.  They have a special authority borrowed from 
the sacrifice of life in the Civil War.  Nonetheless, Garet argues, the 
nature of this heightened authority is radically different in the two 
systems.  Thus, Garet asks: how would the authority of scripture of the 
Constitution change were we to discover that Christ’s sacrifice and the 
deaths at Gettysburg had no historical veracity?  Garet surmises that the 
authority of Christian Scripture would be fundamentally negated 
whereas the authority of the Constitution would be unaffected.  These 
two texts exhibit then contrasting models of authority.  While the 
Constitution sets forth principles and commands adherence to them in 
each generation, whether or not prior generations sacrificed their lives 
on behalf of its principles, Christian Scripture does not merely 
command; it enables faith and love.  But that enablement depends on 
the veracity of Christ’s sacrifice. 
The implicit subject of Jeremy Waldron’s contribution is being and 
becoming.23  Waldron focuses on Paul’s critique of Mosaic law to 
illuminate a central question in jurisprudence: what might law be or 
become?  We may view law as primarily aiming at identifying and 
responding to transgressions or as primarily aiming at voluntary, full 
compliance with its demands.  The purpose that we ascribe to the law 
fundamentally shapes the way in which laws are interpreted and, as we 
see above, this purpose always has a temporal moment.  Thus, 
interpretation varies with the view of what sort of legal system is at 
hand.  Paul’s critique, Waldron argues, adds to our ways of viewing 
systems of law.  Paul directs our attention to the criteria law must 
exhibit if it wishes to be viewed as promoting law-abidingness: the 
requirements of the law must be reasonable and possible for ordinary 
persons to fulfill.  This is the gist of Paul’s antinomianism.  He reveals a 
defect in Mosaic law: it has features that are hard to comply with, given 
what ordinary, reasonable people are like.  This defect precludes 
viewing the law as aimed at law-abidingness—its intermediate aim—
and consequently, precludes the law from becoming, from fulfilling its 
ultimate future aim: salvation. 
Waldron’s invocation of Paul also puts the question of law’s 
audience at the fore.  To whom are legal norms addressed?  While 
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Waldron contrasts legal systems addressed primarily to citizens—
exhorting them to law-abidingness—with those addressed to officials 
who apply sanctions for transgressions—another fruitful contrast 
emerges from juxtaposing Waldron’s invocation of Paul with  Fischer’s 
discussion of the debate between Rabbi Ovadiah and the Haredi school 
as well as Fraade’s invocation of the Deuteronomist.  For Paul, the 
addressee of Mosaic law is the ordinary individual, who is incapable of 
perfectly fulfilling the law on his own.  Hence, the law becomes a 
stumbling block to salvation.  Indeed, the gist of the interpretive battle 
between Rabbi Ovadiah and the haredi community is over the proper 
addressee of the law.  Thus, Rabbi Ovadiah eschews strict 
interpretations that are beyond the capacity of ordinary people.  
Fraade’s invocation of the Deuteronomist adds another dimension to 
this question of the legal subject.  Deuteronomy addresses the polity, 
and not the individual.  It is possible to fulfill the law, Deuteronomy 
explicitly declares.  But fulfillment is conceived in communal and not 
individual terms, as is salvation.  If we interpret “under a description,” 
as Waldron asserts, that interpretation will have to encompass not only 
the aim of the law but also to whom the law is addressed. 
We have finally turned to the third “leg” of the collection’s title: 
the role of reason and its place in mediating the tensions between the 
dual claims of revealed text and interpretive tradition.  This subject has 
only been treated obliquely thus far and so a further word on the 
position of reason in articulating both the text and the hermeneutic 
traditions is called for.  The comparative cases addressed in this 
Symposium make clear how both reason and tradition can be appealed 
to both as independent legal principles as well as a method of 
adjudication.  Reason, in the final analysis is not self-constituted.  
Recall, Max Weber’s famous analysis of irrationality; as rationality in 
the service of itself, rationality posited as a substantive end rather than 
as a method.  Reason of course, as method, is formal and universal in a 
way that traditions—and texts—are not, which is the source of its 
seductive appeal.  In the search to provide an anchor for law these 
qualities of reason present themselves as strong candidates; so strong 
that we often are blinded to the fallible nature of reason when appealed 
to not as a method to adjudicate truth but to produce it.  The appeal to 
tradition too, must however be understood as an appeal to tradition not 
to provide an answer, but as an appeal to a certain form, a certain mode 
of discourse and not as providing access to ultimate authority and 
unmediated revelation.  And it is perhaps at this point that we can 
reflect on the importance of the questions posed in these papers to the 
study of comparative law. 
We begin with authority, a notoriously elusive concept.  Yet, 
several common themes about the nature of authority emerge from these 
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comparative papers.  A relevant theme that has emerged is the “a 
posteriori” or retrospective character of authority.  An authoritative, 
canonical text is not self-executing; it does not constitute itself nor 
appear already marked authoritative.  Rather, authority is vested in prior 
texts, practices, or traditions by its later interpreters and adherents.  It is 
in the nature of authority, however, that its retrospective character 
remains hidden.  As Puett puts it, it comes to appear as the natural order 
of things.  Third, appealing to authoritative texts or traditions is a way 
of shaping a question, of finding a conceptual form, which allows for 
communication diachronically across generations within a given 
tradition.  Since the text or practice is a vehicle for a conversation, such 
appeals never completely settle the question. 
Yet, law and religious practice also require the selection of a single 
norm.  The appeal to authority, conceived as a means of formulating a 
question and initiating a cross-generational dialogue, cannot in itself, 
provide a stable, singular norm.  For this reason, law and religion must 
have institutional structures that enable the selection of a particular 
norm.  Such institutional structures vary across traditions, as we have 
seen.  Their differences are sociologically significant.  Thus, the 
networks of rabbinic authority in the Jewish legal system and the 
various legal schools of Islam provide a more pluralist institutional 
structure than does the monist system of canon law, with its resort to the 
pope. 
This understanding of authority and its structures elucidates how a 
particular norm comes into being, but not how it changes.  How does 
law change?  Various answers have been given to this question in the 
discipline of legal theory, ranging from the formalist model of internal 
processes of law working themselves, pure to the notion that new 
concepts enter into a legal system through different legal systems 
coming into contact with one another.  In this Symposium we have 
stressed another theory of change, one that comes from the force of 
history and contingency.  Social and political forces intrude into a legal 
tradition and impel a response.  In the process, consensus coalesces 
around the turn to new anchors or different methodologies to achieve a 
satisfying result.  New rituals are vested with authority, older texts take 
on new authoritative status, or new interpretive strategies come to be 
seen as acceptable methodologies within the tradition.  How precisely 
consensus operates and is achieved is a question we leave for another 
Symposium. 
